Abstract: Extending Krugman (1991)'s economic geography model, this paper examines a stability of an industrial structure resulting from production shifting-in effect of a formation of regional trade agreements. This paper claims that non-higher external trade costs against non-member countries may need in order to secure the divergence of industries into the area of a regional trade agreement.
Introduction
Recently the question of how the formation of regional trade agreements (RTAs hereafter) affects the location of industry has been studied by a group of economic geography theorists including Baldwin and Venables (1995) and Puga and Venables (1997) . They argued that when some countries form an RTA, production is expected to shift into the RTA. They called it "production shi fting-in effect" of the RTA.
One way to prove their findings is to investigate an increase in the inflows of foreign direct investments into the regional free trade areas from the rest of the world. For instance, see Figure 1 for time series of FDI inflows of the original 15 member countries (signed in as of 1958) in the EC from 1976 to 1998. It is clearly demonstrated that the EC has attracted a large amount of foreign direct investments from abroad. So, the data seems to support their theoretical finding. However, ironically it is also true that there has been an increase in FDI outflows from EC to the rest of the world for the same range of years. See Figure 2 . So, the empirical evidences of the production shifting-in effect of RTA seem ambiguous. This paper tries to fill the gap between their theoretical findings and the data, by reinvestigating the theories of economic geography and regional integration. In particular, this paper shows that the industrial structure resulting from the production shifting -in effect of an RTA, to be stable, may need non-higher external trade costs between the RTA and its non-RTA countries.
In order to explain spatial differences of production structure in an economic geography model, it is essential to include elements such as increasing returns to scale, positive trade costs and imperfect competition. Krugman (1991) and Krugman and Venables (1995) had such common features in their models and showed how they created core-periphery structures through externalities among economic agents. One of the main differences between the two papers is their assumption on factor mobility. In Krugman (1991) , where workers are mobile, an industrial firm needs a unit of worker to produce an output, so when the firm moves to a place, it increases a labor demand in that place, which increases the wage rate. The higher wage will attract workers to move to that place. However, in Krugman and Venables (1995) , where workers are not mobile between countries, a firm is not only a final good supplier to consumers but also an intermediate goods' demander and supplier. When a firm moves to a place, it increases the intermediate goods' demand in that place, which increases its price. The higher price of the intermediate good will attract another intermediate firm to move to that place. Puga and Venablaes (1997) extended Krugman and Venables (1995) to a model of multiple nations. They did several comparative static analyses for exogenous trade barriers among countries and its impact on firms' profitability. The two main results are as follows. First, in a symmetric case with positive trade costs, when the internal trade barriers begin to drop between two RTA countries, the firm outside the RTA starts to move inside because of the higher profits created by lower trade-cost advantages. They acknowledged a similar finding by Baldwin and Venables (1995) . Second, what is novel in their paper is that, when the internal trade barriers continue to drop to zero, even within the regional integration, there occurs a local industrial concentration in one RTA member. Puga and Venables' results are insensitive to a later change in the level of external trade barriers. As a final producer, a firm inside an RTA would always have a cost advantage as long as the internal trade costs are smaller than the external trade costs as a result of a formation of a regional trade agreement. However, the present paper claims that such insensitivity may need to be reconsidered.
To see this, I extend Krugman's (1991) economic geography framework to incorporate multiple nations. Unlike the model developed by Krugman and Venables (1995) , the Krugman (1991)'s model assumes, first, that workers are mobile between countries and peasants are immobile, and second, that both workers and peasants are all consumers in the economy, and third, that firms are final good's producers.
First, I replicate the "production shifting-in" effect of an RTA in the extended Krugman's model. That is, given a positive and symmetric level of all trade costs among countries, a preferential removal of internal trade costs between RTA members makes production shift into the RTA region. This result confirms the production shifting-in effect that has been argued in the economic geography model. Next, in order to check the stability of the industrial structure resulting from the production shifting-in effect to a later increase in the external trade costs, at first I consider a stable asymmetric equilibrium in which (1) all workers and manufacturing firms are concentrated in one of the RTA countries and (2) the exogenously given internal trade costs between the RTA countries are zero and (3) the exogenously given external trade costs between the RTA and its non-RTA are positive. Note that this is very similar to the industrial structure resulting from the production shifting-in effect in Puga and Venables (1997) . I show that, all other things being equal, this equilibrium becomes unstable if the exogenously given external trade costs become higher than the level in (3).
The intuition for this result is as follows. In order to attract a worker to move to a non-RTA country, the defecting firm has to compensate the worker with a higher wage. The higher wage will increase the firm's profit maximizing price in the non-RTA country.
Then the firm's revenues will increase relatively more than the increases in its cost embodied by the higher wage since not only the worker but also the peasants who are living in the country have to pay the higher price.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I will extend a simple model suggested by Krugman (1991) to include multiple nations, and characterize the short run and long run equilibrium. In section 3, I show the effect of the formation of an RTA on global economic geography-production shifting-in effect. In section 4, I show that, the industrial structure resulting from the production shifting-in effect may become unstable if there is a later increase in the external trade costs. Section 5 concludes. τ . This implies that τ units have to be shipped from country j so that one unit arrives in country i.
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
. In Krugman and Venables (1995) and Puga and Venables (1997) , workers are assumed not to be mobile internationally but nationally. In the latter paper, workers are not mobile even within a regionally integrated market.
The representative consumer in each country has Cobb-Douglas preferences over commodity and a CES aggregate of the industrial goods; is defined by
where j n is the large number of potential products in a country j, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties ( 1 > σ ) which is assumed to be the same in all countries. The higher the substitutability, the closer substitutes the varieties 4 .
Equilibrium Conditions
In this section, I derive (1) a demand within a country for varieties of all countries, (2) profit maximizing condition, (3) zero profit condition and (4) factor market clearing condition, all of which are the element of equilibrium analysis. The prices in a country i are
Then the demand for a representative product is in general;
where i m is an income of country i equal to
and i q is a price index of the industrial aggregates. However this price index is considered as a constant value.
Since the number of varieties produced is large as in a Chamberlinian model, the effect of the price of any one variety on the demand for any other will be negligible. So each firm can ignore the effect of its actions on other firms' behavior.
Second, when firms sell in each country, they perceive a constant own price demand elasticity of σ in every market. All firms producing in any particular location have the same profit maximizing FOB price, which is a constant relative mark-up over marginal cost.
(3)
This implies that
Third, when firms enter and exit in response to (+) and (-) profits, at equilibrium in industrial sector profits will be exhausted in every country. That is,
Lastly, following is a labor market clearing condition for a country
The number of manufactured good produced in each country is proportional to the number of workers. This also implies that
Short Run Equilibrium and Long Run Equilibrium
Short run equilibrium will be defined in a Marshallian way, as an equilibrium in which the allocation of workers between countries may be taken as given. However in the long run, workers start to recognize their relative real wage to the other countries. So workers may move towards the economy that offers them higher real wages, leading to either convergence between countries as they move toward equality of worker/peasants ratio or divergence as the workers all congregate in one country.
In the short run, the total income of country i workers is equal to the total spending on these products in all countries. Therefore,
This system of equations determines nominal wages, i w in the short run in which the allocation of workers stays the same. Note that if M=2, then the model turns out Krugman (1991)'s 2-region case. For the purpose of comparison, see Appendix for these conditions when M=3. I will use these conditions in the next section to highlight the effect of the formation of RTA on production patterns.
However in the long run, workers may move based on the relative size of the real wage. To see the real wage in each country, I need to figure out the price index for manufactured goods for consumers residing in that country. Following are the real wage and the price indices when
is the share of the manufacturing labor force in country i.
When j i ϖ ϖ / >1 (<1), the workers move the country i (country j) in the long run.
Such relative size of real wage among countries allows us to see the pattern of economic geography when some of the parameters change. In particular, I am interested in the effect of the formation of regional trade agreements on economic geography.
Regional Trade Agreement and Location of Firms
In this section, I try to show that equal distribution of manufacturing industries among the three countries become unstable after the two of the countries form a regional trade agreement by reducing their internal trade costs. When two countries form an RTA, the firms in the rest of the world have an incentive to move into the RTA because the workers will move in the larger market where they find a higher real wage in the long run, which will be a reason for the firm to find it profitable to enter an RTA. The increase in the real wage of the RTA is a result of the following forces.
The first force comes from an expenditure effect. The existing workers in the RTA can spend more due to the reduction of internal trade costs. As it becomes more profitable for the existing firm to produce more varieties, the firms require additional workers. All other things being equal, this increased demand for labor will increase the nominal wage in the short run. In the long run, the higher wages in the RTA, the lower wages in the rest of the world, and the reduction of internal trade costs all work to increase the relative real wage of the RTA to that of the rest of the world. Therefore production will shift into the RTA area once it is formed.
As such a movement of productions and workers continues it is expected that the labor competition within the RTA will increase. Since the RTA makes its market larger than the rest of the world, the workers of the RTA will face high competition, which induces a decrease in nominal wage. The labor competition effect works to stop the production shifting-in effect eventually at some point of time.
Next two subsections will show how I got these results using numerical experiments with the equilibrium conditions (6) and (7) , from the long run real wage equations in (7). So the workers can't find out any incentive to move their countries toward any other countries.
After the Formation of RTA
Now, given this symmetric specification, what if the country 1 and 2 formed an RTA?
and the formation of the RTA between country 1 and 2, imply
. To analyze its consequences for both integrating countries and the rest of the world, let's remove only the internal trade cost, and keep the external trade cost unchanged, that is,
Since I start out with the symmetric world, the nominal wages within the RTA must be equalized even after the formation of the RTA, 2 1 w w = . However, the formation of the RTA creates a nominal wage gap between the RTA members and non-RTA members for the following reason.
First, since the internal trade costs are removed, the workers' expenditure will increase relatively. So, it is more profitable for firms to produce within the RTA. It, in turn, creates more demand for workers in RTA regions. This will increase nominal wages within the RTA countries higher than ones in the rest of the world. In a symmetric world with parameter specifications such as
, using the equation (6), one can easily calculate the nominal wage gaps between RTA and non-RTA area,
Second, however, in the long run, workers start to perceive the real wage differences between countries with an RTA and the rest of the world. A worker's real wage in equation (7) is affected by the nominal wages not only of his own country but also of the other countries through the price index. When the internal trade costs drop within the RTA, the nominal wage of the members increases. This has a direct positive effect on real wages of RTA members. Moreover, the price index is positively affected by the reduction of internal trade costs, the higher wages in members, and the lower wages in non-member all together. A simple calculation for (7) also shows that the real wage effect of an RTA member is positive, so the formation of the RTA would create an incentive for workers to move into the RTA from the rest of world.
Lastly, since the sum of workers from the RTA member countries becomes larger and larger as the process of movements of productions and workers proceeds, there will be an increase in labor competition within RTA. This plays a role in reducing the nominal wage in the short run, which will stop such movements at some point of time. See Figure 3 The proposition 1 for a symmetric case replicates a qualitatively same result as in Baldwin and Venables (1995) and Puga and Venables (1997) . This result is robust in that, once countries form a regional trade agreements, the production shifting-in effect is always expected. However, in the next section, I will show that the industrial structure resulting from the production shifting-in effect could be unstable for a later increase in the level of external trade costs.
A Firm's Incentive to Defect from Local Manufacturing Concentrations
In this section I start out with the Puga and Venables (1997)'s situation in which all manufacturing firms are concentrated in one member of the RTA. The purpose of this section is to find out instability of industrial structure resulting from the production shifting-in effect to a later increase in external trade costs, by examining a firm's incentive to move out to the rest of the world when the external trade costs becomes higher.
Suppose that there are three countries, 1, 2 and 3 in the world and the trade costs are defined as
Now consider a situation in which all workers and manufacturing firms are concentrated in country 1. Country 1, then, will be the largest market in the world. Since a share of total income, µ , is spent on manufactures and all this income goes to country 1, I have the following income ratio between countries. where n is the total number of manufacturing firms concentrated in country 1. Now let's think about an incentive for a firm to defect this situation. A firm may defect to relocate in either country 2 or country 3. If it does not defect, then concentration of production in country 1 is in equilibrium. If it does defect, the concentration is not in equilibrium. In fact, the point that I want to see here is that under what condition the formation of RTA makes this equilibrium unstable and how it makes the firm defect.
An Incentive to Move from Country 1 to Country 2
In order for a defecting firm to relocate the productions in country 2, the firm must be able to attract workers. To do so, it must compensate them for the fact that all manufactures must be imported. So the relative nominal wages between 1 and 2 must be (10)
Given this higher wage, the firm will charge a profit-maximizing price that is higher than that of other firms in the same proportion. Now I can drive the value of the firms' sales using this fact.
In country 1, the defecting firm's value of sales will be the value of sales of a representative firm times
. In country 2, its value of sales will be that of a representative firm times
. So total value of the defecting firm's sales will be: Note that trade costs work to the defecting firm's disadvantage in its sales to consumers in country 1, but work to its advantage in sales to people in country 2. Note also that when the cost is zero, the sales in country 1 and 2 are the same. As the cost increases, the sales of the defecting firm will change negatively due to the first term in (11) and positively due to the second term in (11).
From all these equations in (9), (10) and (11), I can derive the ratio of the value of sales by this defecting firm to the sales of firms in country 1:
However, because fixed costs are higher in country 2 due to the higher wage rate, the defecting firm must have
as follows.
[ ]
v >1, the relative value of sales by the defecting firms for the value of sales in country 1 is greater than the fixed cost for the firm to attract the workers from country 1 to country 2, that is, v will be less than or equal to 1.
As the cost increases beyond some critical level, the firm's relative value of sales will be higher than 1 when it defects to country 2.
Incentive to Move from Country 1 to Country 3
Likewise, if the defecting country decides to produce in country 3, ) / ) ( (
will be a function of external trade cost t, instead of τ. Just replace τ with t! (14) [ ]
Again, with the same reason, when 1 , 3 v >1, it is profitable for a firm to move and begin production in country 3 if all other manufacturing production is concentrated in country 1; when 1 , 3 v <1, it is not profitable. The same Figure 4 will be used for the analysis.
Next, I am going to find a stable asymmetric equilibrium where all manufacturing firms are concentrated in country 1 with a zero internal trade barrier and a positive external trade barrier. Then I will show that when the external trade costs are too high, the firm will defect to move out to country 3. v will be greater than 1. This implies that a firm facing a higher trade costs between the RTA and its non-RTA country will have an incentive to move to the non-RTA area. Proposition 2 summarizes these results.
Instability of the
Proposition 2 Suppose that there are three countries, (country1, 2 and 3) in the world and all workers and manufacturing firms are concentrated in country 1. The intuition for this result is as follows. Due to the manufacturing concentration in country 1, all workers reside in country 1. When a firm tries to move to country 3, it has to attract a worker to move to country 3 as well. To do so, it has to compensate for the high fixed costs due to the high trade costs. With a higher wage in country 3, the worker will spend more money in country 3. Moreover, given the higher wage, the defecting firm will set a higher profit-maximizing price in country 3. Since the peasant in country 3 also has to pay the higher price to buy the variety produced by the defecting firm, the defecting firm's revenue will be higher in country 3 than in country 1. As a result, it would be more profitable for the firm to move out to the rest of the world.
Concluding Remark
The production shifting-in effect of an RTA has been argued by several economic geography theorists such as Baldwin and Venables (1995) and Puga and Venables (1997) . However the empirical evidences seemed ambiguous.
In this paper, I re-examined an industrial structure resulting from the production shifting-in effect of an RTA. In particular I focused on a later increase in the external trade costs. To examine this issue, I extended the Krugman's (1991) economic geography model in a way that workers are hired by manufacturing firms across multiple nations.
First, I replicated the production shifting-in effect of an RTA in this extended Krugman's model. That is, I showed that a regional integration, which drops its internal trade costs below given external trade costs, always pulls industry to its region and benefits the members. The outside manufacturing firms find it profitable to move in and serve the inside market of the regional integration since it gives the inside market cost advantages.
Next, to check a sensitivity of the industrial outcome resulting from the production shifting-in effect, I considered a stable asymmetric equilibrium where workers and manufacturing firms are concentrated in one member country of the RTA with zero internal trade costs and positive external trade costs, and saw what would happen if the 21 external trade costs become higher. I showed that when the exogenous external trade costs become higher against its non-RTA member, the inside manufacturing firms of the integrated region begin finding it profitable to move out and serve the outside market. This is because the costs to attract manufacturing workers are less than the revenues from both workers and peasants due to the higher profit-maximizing price.
This result shows that the industrial structure resulting from the production shifting-in effect of an RTA, to be stable, may need non-higher external trade costs in an economic geography model with a mobility of workers, which has not been able to be shown in the previous economic geography literature due to the assumption of the immobility of workers. 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 YEAR US millions 
